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For the original, solution image, see Figure 2 overleaf.SUMMARY
What brain mechanisms underlie learning of new
knowledge from single events?We studied encoding
in long-term memory of a unique type of one-shot
experience, induced perceptual insight. While under-
going an fMRI brain scan, participants viewed
degraded images of real-world pictures where
the underlying objects were hard to recognize
(‘‘camouflage’’), followed by brief exposures to the
original images (‘‘solution’’), which led to induced
insight (‘‘Aha!’’). A week later, the participants’
memory was tested; a solution image was classified
as ‘‘remembered’’ if detailed perceptual knowledge
was elicited from the camouflage image alone.
During encoding, subsequently remembered images
were associatedwith higher activity inmidlevel visual
cortex and medial frontal cortex, but most
pronouncedly, in the amygdala, whose activity could
be used to predict which solutions will remain in
long-term memory. Our findings extend the known
roles of amygdala in memory to include promotion
of long-term memory of the sudden reorganization
of internal representations.
INTRODUCTION
A substantial part of the knowledge that we acquire in real life is
a consequence of a one-time exposure to an event, yet the brain
mechanisms that underlie this type of rapid learning are largely
unknown. While the prevalent example of single-event knowl-
edge acquisition is episodic memory (Roediger et al., 2007;
Tulving, 1983), another type of real-life single-event learning is
insight: the sudden realization of a solution to a problem
(Hebb, 1949; Ko¨hler, 1925). Although insight is most often dis-
cussed in the context of cognitive tasks such as problem solving
(Kaplan and Simon, 1990; Sternberg and Davidson, 1995),
abrupt improvements in performance, as well as the subjective
‘‘Aha!’’ experience characteristic of insight, can also be
observed in perception (Porter, 1954; Rubin et al., 1997, 2002).1002 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.The sudden realization of the solution may happen spontane-
ously, but it can also be induced by an external cue, both in
cognitive problem solving (Maier, 1931) and in perception.
Readers may be able to experience induced perceptual insight
for themselves by viewing Figure 1, which was generated by
degrading a real-world picture, taking a few moments to try to
identify the underlying scene, and then turning to Figure 2 (next
page), which shows the original image. Upon re-exposure
to the degraded image, or ‘‘camouflage’’ (Figure 1), many
observers report perceiving a compelling depiction of the under-
lying scene—just moments after the very same image appeared
as a meaningless collection of ink blots.
In daily life, information that results frommoments of insight is,
almost by definition, incorporated into long-term memory: once
we have realized a new way to solve a problem, or to perform
a task better and faster, we are not likely to forget that insight
easily. But what is the neural basis of this long-lasting nature
of insight? Other forms of learning typically require long training
periods and many repeated trials, as has been observed
in sensory and perceptual learning (e.g., Gauthier and Tarr,
1997; Karni and Sagi, 1991; Seitz and Watanabe, 2009), motor
learning (e.g., Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981), and rote-learning
in animals (e.g., Stevens and Savin, 1962). These timescales
accord well with the long-held idea that incorporation of
new knowledge into long-term memory involves synaptic
Figure 2. The Original Picture, or Solution Image, Used to Generate
Figure 1
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Brain Correlates of Memory of Induced Insightmodifications that require gradual processes, sometimes over
weeks or months (Dudai, 2004; Hebb, 1949; Martin et al.,
2000; Squire and Kandel, 1999). Yet recent findings indicate
that modifications of schemas may form and stabilize quickly
(Tse et al., 2007). The retention of insights in memory may there-
fore provide another avenue to the study of neural events that
support the rapid formation of long-term memories.
Induced perceptual insight offers several attractive character-
istics as a laboratory model for learning that results from real-life
insightful transitions. It allows the experimenter to induce the
representational transition fairly reliably at predictable moments,
with the presentation of a hint (the original image) for a brief
amount of time—an advantage of particular value when investi-
gating encoding in the fMRI environment. And although the tran-
sition to the new, insightful perceptual state was externally
induced, rather than occurring spontaneously, it often invokes
a similar sense of an ‘‘Aha!’’ moment. How the moment of insight
came about is obviously of central importance for studies that
are primarily concerned with the mental and/or neural processes
that give rise to spontaneous insight (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008). However, unlike
those previous studies, our aim here was to study the neural
correlates of memory retention of insightful solutions. In this
context, induced perceptual insight offers another important
methodological advantage: it is possible to generate a large
set of camouflage images and their associated solutions, and
expose observers to such large collections of puzzle-solution
pairs within, say, an hour—thus obtaining multiple induced
insight events in a time frame that lends itself well to fMRI scan-
ning (Dolan et al., 1997).
Many observers feel that the perceptual transition they have
just experienced was so dramatic that they are going to
remember the solution for a long time thereafter.Whenpresented
with a single such exemplar (e.g., the dog in Figure 1), the declar-
ative memory of the distinct encoding event may serve as a cue
that facilitates reconstruction of the insightful solution (e.g.,
when encountering this article again, you might remember that
there was a dog in the camouflage image and, if it does not pop
out, you might search for it). But what will be the fate of the cam-
ouflage solutions in terms of their retention in memory when
observers are exposed to many of them (say, 30) in one session?
Would they remember all of the solutions? This seems unlikely.
On the other hand, it is possible that they would remember the
solutions to a good fraction of those images. If so, what deter-
mineswhich solutions images are retained inmemory, andwhich
are not? In particular, can one identify patterns of brain activity
that occur during the realization of a solution that could predict
the memory outcome of this solution? This is the question we
set out to answer in this study by employing a subsequent
memory paradigm, similar to that used in exploring brain mecha-
nisms of encoding of other types of event memory (Brewer et al.,
1998; Hasson et al., 2008; Paller et al., 1987;Wagner et al., 1998).
We began by generating a large set of candidate images by
systematically degrading pictures of real-world scenes and eval-
uating them in pilot experiments. A degraded image was classi-
fied as ‘‘a good camouflage’’ if enough observers were unable to
recognize the hidden object prior to exposure to the solution
(original, undegraded) image, and yet endorsed it as a perceptu-ally compelling rendition of the original after exposure to the
latter image. Next, we tested new groups of subjects for memory
retention of the solutions in behavioral experiments. Subjects
participated in two sessions. In the first, ‘‘Study’’ session,
subjects were first shown each of a set of camouflage images
and given an opportunity to report if they recognized the hidden
object. They were then exposed to the solution (original) image,
and finally back to the camouflage. Subjects were not asked to
remember the solutions nor told that the experiment was related
to memory. They returned at a later, prearranged time for
a second, ‘‘Test’’ session. They were shown the same set of
camouflage images, intermingled with a smaller set of novel
images, and asked to identify the hidden object in each of the
images in turn. This time, however, they were not shown the
solution at any stage. Instead, if they made a correct identifica-
tion (e.g., ‘‘a dog’’ in Figure 1), subjects were given a follow-up
question that probed the detail and vividness of their perception
(e.g., ‘‘Where is the nose of the dog?’’). Note that our test proce-
dure therefore probed memory for the content of the induced
insight event (‘‘What is hidden in this camouflage image?’’),
and not the episodic memory of the event itself (‘‘Do you
remember seeing the solution?’’).
We used fMRI scanning to compare brain activity for camou-
flage images whose solutions were subsequently retained in
memory and the activity for the camouflages whose solutions
were forgotten. Since we were interested specifically in activity
differences during the moment of induced insight—i.e., during
presentation of the solution in the first, Study session—subjects
were scanned during this session only. The behavioral tests indi-
cated that participants retained many of the solutions in long-
term memory, but also forgot a sizable fraction. Importantly,
different participants tended to remember different subsets of
images, and therefore whatever differential fMRI activity we
found could not be attributable to differences in the stimulus
sets.
We found that activity in several brain regions was correlated
with subsequent long-term memory of the solution. Most prom-
inent was the finding that activity in the amygdala during the
moment of insight predicted long-term memory retention of the
solution. In fact, we were able to use amygdala activity to predictNeuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1003
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participants. The role of the amygdala in emotional memory is
well established (e.g., McGaugh, 2004; Phelps and LeDoux,
2005). Note, however, that none of the camouflage images in
our experiments were in and of themselves emotional, though
the internal evaluation of the insightful transition might have
incited emotion. This suggests that the amygdala plays an
important role also in encoding events whose importance is
not given a priori and externally, but rather evaluated internally.
We also found activity correlated with subsequent memory
in midlevel visual cortex and medial frontal cortex. The
Discussion provides an account of how activity in those regions
may be related to internal evaluative processes while viewing
subsequently remembered solutions, and to the subjective
‘‘Aha!’’ experience that often accompanies insight.
RESULTS
Three experiments are reported here: each consisted of a Study
session, in which subjects were exposed to camouflage images
and their solutions, and a Test session, in which subsequent
memory of the camouflage solutions was tested. Figure 3 pres-
ents the protocol used in Experiment 2 (whole-brain fMRI; see
Figures S1 and S3 available online for the slightly different proto-1004 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.cols used in Experiments 1 and 3.) Experiment 1 provided behav-
ioral measures of the retention in memory of the camouflage
solutions over time (no fMRI scanning). In Experiments 2 and 3,
the Study session was performed while new groups of partici-
pants were undergoing fMRI scanning: whole-brain scanning in
Experiment 2 and a higher-resolution scan focused on the amyg-
dala in Experiment 3. In both Experiments 2 and 3, the Test
session was performed outside the magnet, 1 week after the
Study session.
Experiment 1: Memory of the Acquired solutions
to Camouflage Images
Participants first completed a Study session in which they were
exposed to the camouflage images followed by their solutions.
Participants saw 30 images out of the total set of 40 (selected
randomly for each participant). For each image, the participants
indicated whether they perceived the camouflaged object spon-
taneously prior to the solution. Spontaneously recognized
images were excluded from the memory analysis (this resulted
in the exclusion of different images for different participants;
see below). To assess memory retention over time of those
images that were not recognized spontaneously, four different
groups of participants were administered a Test session after
four different time lags: 15 min, 1 day, 1 week, and 3 weeks.Figure 3. The Protocol of Experiment 2
(A) Study session, performed in the fMRI scanner.
The session included 30 trials. Each consisted of
CAM1, the first camouflage exposure (participants
press ‘‘Yes’’ if they think they identified the hidden
object); ISI (interstimulus interval, blank screen);
SOL, solution (camouflage and original images
alternate at 0.5 s epochs); ISI; CAM2, a second
camouflage exposure; and QUERY, in which
participants report their recognition at CAM1.
Trials lasted 20–30 s each and were separated
by an intertrial interval (ITI) of 3–6 s.
(B) Test session, performed 7 days after Study,
outside the scanner. This session included 40
trials: the 30 camouflage images presented in the
Study session, interleaved with 10 novel images.
In each trial, participants were given up to 10 s to
press a button if they recognized the camouflage
image. They were then given a multiple choice
recognition test (four alternatives), followed by
a confidence rating (three levels). If they answered
the multiple choice correctly, participants were
presented with the camouflage image superim-
posed with a grid of numerals (Grid task), and
instructions to find the numeral at the location of
a specific feature in the image.
See Figures S1 and S3 for the slightly different
protocols used in Experiments 1 and 3.
Figure 4. Forgetting Curves in Experiment 1
Top panel: Performance on the multiple choice task by separate groups of
participants tested 15 min, 1 day, 7 days, and 21 days after a Study session,
respectively. Bottom panel: Performance of the same groups on the subse-
quent Grid task. In both panels, images that participants recognized spontane-
ously during Study were excluded from the calculation of the percentages
correct. The dashed lines depict average performance of all the groups on
the 10 images not presented during Study; these novel imageswere a different,
randomly selected subset for each observer. Error bars = SEM.
Neuron
Brain Correlates of Memory of Induced InsightParticipants were again presented with the 30 images from the
Study, intermixed with 10 novel images that they were not previ-
ously exposed to. Perception of the object embedded in the cam-
ouflage was tested first by a multiple choice question, and if
a correct answer was given, perception was tested also by
a requirement to indicate the location of a specific feature in the
scene (‘‘Grid’’ task; Figure S1). Figure 4 presents the memory
performance of the different groups: of the images that were
not spontaneously recognized during Study, 88% ± 3% were
correctly identified in the multiple choice test 15 min after the
completion of the Study, declining to 76% ± 3% in the 1 day
lag group, 57% ± 4% in the 1 week group, and 58% ± 4% in
the 3 weeks group (top panel). The correct response in the Grid
task, which more faithfully ascertains the vividness of recogni-
tion, was 66%± 5%, 46%± 4%, 36%± 5%, and 33%± 5%after
15 min, 1 day, 1 week, and 3 weeks, respectively (bottom panel).
There was no significant difference in performance between the
1 week group and the 3 weeks group. Thus, if the solution to
acamouflage image is retained1weekafter seeing it, it is retained
to essentially to the same degree also 3 weeks afterwards.
Might the performance during the Test reflect a learning set or
skill acquisition of the task, rather than stimulus-specificmemoryof the camouflage images and their associated solutions? This
can be addressed by examining performance on the 10 camou-
flage images not seen during the Study session. In all four time-
lag groups, performance was significantly better on images that
were presented in the Study versus novel images. This differen-
tial performance cannot be attributed to differences in the
images’ attributes, since each participant saw a different subset
of 30 camouflage images during Study, drawn randomly from the
total of 40 images. Moreover, no significant difference was found
between the performance of the different time groups on the
novel images (Figure 4, open symbols; Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA
by ranks), indicating that the degradation in performance over
time on the images seen at Study was not due to a general
decline in task performance.
The spontaneous recognition rate in the Study session was
34% ± 3%. There was no significant difference in spontaneous
recognition between the four different time groups. This level is
similar to the multiple choice correct recognition of novel images
during Test (Figure 4), and a dependent samples t test showed
no significant difference between the performances in the two
tasks, suggesting that there was no general learning of the
task above and beyond the stimulus-specific learning.
Importantly, there was no subset of images that accounted for
the majority of the remembered images. We calculated the
frequency distribution of the Grid task correct responses per
image, and the resulted distribution did not significantly differ
from the normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk, p = 0.07). To test for
possible effects of image content on subsequent memory, we
performed a Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA on correct recognition per
image, grouping images by their content (a human figure, an
insect, an animal, an object, a face, or a complex scene). There
was no effect of content on subsequent memory performance.
Experiment 2: Brain Correlates of the Encoding
of Subsequent Memory of the Acquired solution
On the basis of the results of Experiment 1, which showed similar
memory performance after 1 week and 3 weeks, we decided to
test subsequent memory 1 week after we performed fMRI scan-
ning during the Study session in Experiment 2 (see Figure 3 for
the protocol and the notation of its stages).
Behavioral Performance
Performance in Experiment 2 Was Similar
to that of Experiment 1
The participants in Experiment 2, who performed the Study
session in the scanner, recognized spontaneously 27% ± 3% of
the camouflages. In the Test session 1 week later, they provided
a correct response to 56% ± 4% of the camouflages in the
multiple choice test and 44% ± 5% in the Grid task. (Here as
elsewhere, spontaneously recognized images were excluded
in calculating memory performance.) There was no significant
difference between the memory performance of the participants
in Experiment 2 and those tested 1 week after Study in Experi-
ment 1. In addition, spontaneous recognition was reproducible
across the Study and Test sessions: for images reported as
spontaneously recognized during Study, the correct response
Test was 85% ± 4% in the multiple choice test and 78% ± 6%
in the Grid task. Importantly, and as in Experiment 1, there wasNeuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1005
Figure 5. During Presentation of the solution, the
Left Amygdala Was the Brain Region Showing the
Greatest Difference in Activity between Subse-
quently Remembered and Not Remembered
Images
(A) Sagittal and axial views of brain regions obtained by
contrasting activation during SOL, collapsed across all
trial types, with the baseline condition (blank screen).
This analysis, which is unbiased with respect to subse-
quent memory or spontaneous recognition performance,
was used to delineate the amygdala ROI. Other regions
showing SOL-related activity are also shown (LO, lateral
occipital sulcus; VOT, ventral occipito-temporal; dlPFC,
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex; lOFC, lateral orbital frontal
cortex. For the full list see Table S1.)
(B) Time courses of activity during presentation of the
camouflage image and its solution in the left amygdala.
Left panel: Percent signal change average during CAM1,
sorted according to recognition performance as reported
in the Study QUERY stage. Green, activity while observing
spontaneously identified images (SPONT); purple, NotI-
dentified images (REM and NotREM collapsed). Right
panel: Percent signal change average during SOL,
sorted according to subsequent memory performance in
Study. Red, subsequently remembered (REM); blue, not
remembered (NotREM). (The green curve again denotes
activity while observing spontaneously identified images,
SPONT.)
Error bars = SEM.
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remembered trials across participants, nor were there significant
content effects. These results attain special importance for the
fMRI analysis, since any difference in BOLD activity that we
may find during Study between images that were subsequently
remembered and those that were not remembered would not
be attributable to content differences in the images themselves.
False Alarms Did Not Affect Subsequent Memory
For some images, participants had false alarms: they pressed the
button to indicate identification of the hidden object during the
first presentation of the camouflage image (CAM1, Figure 3A),
but after seeing the solution (SOL, Figure 3A), they indicated
that they did not actually identify the underlying object correctly
(QUERY stage, cf. Figure 3A). False alarms constituted 23% of
the camouflage trials that participants indicated as NotIdentified
in QUERY. The group performance in the test Grid task for false
alarm images (i.e., correct identification at Test despite having
a false alarm during the Study CAM1) was 44%, the same as
the mean performance for all NotIdentified images, showing no
apparent effect of false alarms on subsequent memory. Those
images were therefore included in the subsequent memory
analyses.
fMRI Results
Our aim was to uncover brain regions in which activity during
Study was correlated with subsequent acquired recognition of
the object embedded in the camouflage image. Hence the Study
trials were classified based on the behavioral performance as
follows: trials in which the camouflage was reported as sponta-
neously identified (i.e., when the participant pressed ‘‘Yes’’ at1006 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.the QUERY stage during Study) were labeled SPONT. The re-
maining trials were classified based on performance during the
Test session: those for which the solution was remembered
1 week later were labeled REM, and those for which the solution
was not remembered were labeled NotREM. Only images that
were answered correctly at both the multiple choice task and
the Grid task at Test were labeled REM in the subsequent
memory analysis. (See Experimental Procedures for further anal-
yses made to validate this choice.)
We report results from a select set of regions of interest (ROIs),
as well as a whole-brain general linear model (GLM) analysis.
In the GLM analysis, each stage in the trial (CAM1, SOL,
CAM2) was considered as a separate condition, resulting in
nine conditions: CAM1-REM, CAM1-NotREM, CAM1-SPONT,
SOL-REM, et cetera. Similarly, in the ROI analyses presented
below, time course data from each of the stages were treated
separately according to the behavioral performance.
Activity in the Left Amygdala Correlated
with Subsequent Memory
The amygdala ROI was obtained in an analysis that delineated
the regions that were mostly engaged during the presentation
of the camouflage solution (i.e., during the period of induced
perceptual insight) by contrasting SOL versus baseline activity
for all trials, regardless of recognition and/or memory outcome
of the trial. (See Experimental Procedures subsection Regions
of Interest Experiment 2.) In addition to the amygdala, this
contrast also revealed extensive activations in visual and frontal
cortices (Figure 5A; for the full list of activations see Table S1
available online; visual ROIs were defined using independent
localizer data; see below).
Figure 6. Spontaneous Identification and
Subsequent Memory Effects in Midlevel
Visual Cortex
Left panels: Event-triggered average activity
during CAM1, sorted according to recognition
performance as reported in the Study QUERY
stage. Green, activity while observing spontane-
ously identified images (SPONT); Purple, NotIden-
tified images. Right panels: Averaged activity
during SOL, sorted according to subsequent
memory performance in Study. Red, subsequently
remembered (REM); blue, not remembered (No-
tREM); green, spontaneously identified images
(SPONT). The ROIs were delineated based on
the visual localizer runs (see Experimental Proce-
dures). LO, lateral occipital sulcus; pFs, posterior
fusiform sulcus. Time courses presented here
were extracted from the right hemisphere ROIs.
For a view of these ROIs, see Figure S2. Error
bars = SEM.
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activity in the amygdala ROI during CAM1 (left panel) and SOL
(right panel). During SOL the left amygdala showed a significantly
higher activation for REM than for NotREM. In the right amyg-
dala, activation for REM images was also higher than for
NotREM ones; however, the difference was not significant (see
Figure S3). We did not observe significant subsequent memory
effects in the amygdala during CAM1 or CAM2.
Activity in Visual Cortex Correlated with Subsequent
Memory
Four visual cortical ROIs were delineated using data from the
‘‘object localizer’’ functional scans (contrasting responses to
pictures of everyday objects with scrambled versions of the
same objects; see Experimental Procedures). Two were subre-
gions of the lateral occipital cortex (LOC), the LO (the part
of the LOC in and around the lateral occipital sulcus) and
theposterior fusiform sulcus (pFs), and theotherswere the collat-
eral sulcus (CoS) and the EarlyVis (in and around the calcarine
fissure) ROIs. (See Figure S2 and Table S1 for anatomical loci.)
We hypothesized that regions in the LOC would show higher
activity (1) for SPONT events in comparison with trials in which
the camouflage was not identified during the CAM1 phase of
the trials; and (2) for REM events, compared with NotREM
events, during the SOL phase of the trials (presentation of the
camouflage alternating with the solution). The first hypothesis
is straightforward given the extensive evidence that the LOCNeuron 69, 1002–1014plays a key role in human object recogni-
tion (Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector
et al., 2000). The second hypothesis
was based on the idea that subsequent
memory is more likely in trials when the
underlying object is perceived more
vividly (after exposure to the solution).
This should be observable as higher
LOC activity in those trials, compared
with trials when the camouflage image
was perceived by the participant asgiving only a poor portrayal of the solution image. Analysis of
the event-triggered average time course data from our (indepen-
dently acquired and delineated) LOC ROIs confirmed both
hypotheses and, at the same time, exposed interesting differen-
tial effects within its subregions (Figure 6). Specifically, during
SOL the right LO (top panels), but not the pFs (bottom panels),
showed significantly higher activity for trials that were subse-
quently remembered compared with trials whose solution was
not remembered.
Activity in Medial Frontal and Parietal Cortices
Correlated with Subsequent Memory
Amultisubject voxel-by-voxel subsequent memory contrast was
conducted, comparing SOL-REM with SOL-NotREM trials. This
unveiled, in addition to clusters of voxels in the LOC, foci of
subsequent memory-correlated activation during SOL, mainly
in left medial prefrontal regions (mPFC, BA 9 and BA 10), in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and in the precuneus (Figure 7;
the full list of significant foci of activation is provided in Table S1).
No Correlation with Subsequent Memory Was Detected
in the Hippocampus
Since the hippocampal formation is commonly implicated in
multiple types of memory tasks, and also since we found activa-
tion in the hippocampus when contrasting SOL trials with base-
line trials (albeit in a small cluster of voxels; see Table S1), we
delineated hippocampus ROIs (head, body, and tail) based on
anatomical landmarks. Although the hippocampus ROIs do, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1007
Figure 7. Brain Regions Showing Higher Activity during Presenta-
tion of the solutions of Subsequently Remembered Camouflage
Images
Top panels: Awhole-brain analysis revealed a network of regions including foci
in the leftmedial prefrontal cortex (mPFC); right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC);
and the precuneus. (Presented are medial views of left and right hemispheres;
for the full list of significant foci, see Table S2.) Bottom panels: Percent signal
change averages according to subsequent memory and independent recogni-
tion performance during SOL. Green, activation while observing the solution of
spontaneously identified images (SPONT); red, subsequently remembered
(REM); blue, not remembered (NotREM). Error bars = SEM.
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memory differential activation in any of these hippocampal ROIs.
Experiment 3: Using Amygdala BOLD Data to Predict
Subsequent Memory of the Acquired solution
On the basis of the results of Experiment 2, we ran a third experi-
ment aimed at using fMRI data from a study session to predict
memory performance at a test to be done 1 week later. The
protocol was slightly different than that of Experiment 2 (in Study,
CAM1was6s insteadof 10s,andCAM2was removed;seeExper-
imental Procedures and Figure S3; the Test sessionwas identical).
Behavioral Performance
The participants in Experiment 3, who performed the Study
session in the scanner and saw 40 images (instead of 30 as in1008 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Experiments 1 and 2), recognized spontaneously 34% ± 8% of
the camouflages. In the Test session 1 week later, they provided
a correct response to 42% ± 15% of the camouflages in the
multiple choice test and 27% ± 15% in the Grid task. Again,
and as in Experiments 1 and 2, images that participants reported
they recognized spontaneously were not included in thememory
analysis. There was no significant difference between the
memory performance in the Grid task of the participants in
Experiment 3 and those tested 1 week after the study in Exper-
iment 1 (two-tailed t test, independent samples; p = 0.24), though
there was a difference in the performance in the multiple choice
test (p = 0.025), which might be due to the larger image set used
in the study. There was no significant difference in the sponta-
neous recognition during Study.
fMRI Analysis
In Experiment 2 BOLD activity in the left amygdala correlated
pronouncedly with subsequent long-termmemory performance.
Thus in Experiment 3 we set out to test if amygdala activity
during Study may serve to predict subsequent recognition of
camouflage images at Test on a trial-by-trial basis. Hence we
scanned the participants while they performed the Study using
a high-resolution EPI, resulting in 2*2*2 mm voxels, keeping
the same TR (2 s). The scan did not cover the whole brain, but
had our ROI—the amygdala—in the center of the field of view
(FOV) (see Figure S3). Trials were first classified based only on
the Study session behavior as follows: trials in which the camou-
flage was reported as spontaneously identified (i.e., when the
participant pressed ‘‘Yes’’ at the QUERY stage) were labeled
SPONT. The rest of the trials in which the camouflage was
reported as not identified spontaneously were labeled
NotIdentified. We then used the SOL versus baseline contrast,
as was done in Experiment 2, to delineate the subject-specific
amygdala ROIs which we a priori set out to test. Subsequent
memory information was not used at this stage to avoid circu-
larity when choosing the voxels whose data is used for predic-
tion. Next, we calculated the area under the curve for the peak
time points of each NotIdentified trial. The trials were sorted
by this measure, and following the results of the previous exper-
iments, the top 40% of the sorted trials list were predicted to be
subsequently remembered, while the rest were predicted to be
not remembered.
Left Amygdala Activity Predicted Subsequent
Long-Term Memory of the Camouflage solution
When we compared the above described prediction with the
actual performance of the participants at Test, the average hit
rate of the prediction (i.e., the number of trials in which the image
was predicted to be remembered, and was indeed recognized at
the Grid task 1 week later, as a fraction of the total number of
REM trials) was (0.548 ± 0.127). The average false alarm rate
of the prediction (i.e., the number of trials in which the image
was predicted to be remembered yet was not recognized at
the Grid task 1 week later, as a fraction of the total number of
NotREM trials) was (0.312 ± 0.052). The average d-prime for
the prediction was (0.628 ± 0.445). The hit rate versus false alarm
rate relation per subject is depicted in Figure 8. As in Experiment
2 the right amygdala also showed higher activity in REM trials
than in NotREM ones. Yet again that difference was much
Figure 8. Memory Prediction Accuracy
Hit rate (y scale; i.e., the number of trials in which the image was predicted to
be remembered and was indeed recognized at the Grid task 1 week later, as
a fraction of the total number of REM trials) and false alarm rate (x scale; i.e.,
the number of trials in which the image was predicted to be remembered,
yet was not recognized at the Grid task 1 week later, as a fraction of the total
number of NotREM trials) relation per subject. Each [blue/black] circle repre-
sents a participant. The dotted line depicts chance-level accuracy. For the
Study protocol of Experiment 3, which was slightly different from that of Exper-
iment 2, a view of the slice prescription used, and the time courses of the
amygdala ROIs, see Figure S3.
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alarm rate, and d-prime for the prediction based on the right
amygdala ROI were (0.446 ± 0.102), (0.356 ± 0.073), and
(0.237 ± 0.461), correspondingly.
DISCUSSION
We developed a paradigm to study the behavioral and brain
mechanisms that lead to long-term memory of a brief, unique
experience: induced perceptual insight. We found that activity
in several brain regions correlated with subsequent long-term
memory of the insightful information encoded during a brief
exposure to the original images (solutions) of degraded, unrec-
ognized real-world pictures (camouflages). Most notably,
activity in the amygdala during the moment of induced insight
was linked to long-term memory retention of the solution.
Indeed, fMRI (BOLD) activity in the amygdala during exposure
to the camouflage solutions could be used to predict which solu-
tions will remain in memory 1 week later, on a trial-by-trial basis,
with impressive reliability.
It is well established that the amygdala plays an important role
in processing and encoding emotional information (e.g., Hamann
et al., 1999; McGaugh, 2004; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005), and
highly emotional events are often learned in one or few trials
(Rutishauser et al., 2006; Tye et al., 2008). Amygdala activity
modulates the strength of emotional memories (Cahill and
McGaugh, 1996), possibly by facilitating cortical processing
during salient learning events (Armony et al., 1998; Paz et al.,
2006). The amygdala was also shown to represent the rapidly
changing value of visual stimuli that were paired with a rewarding
or aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) (Paton et al., 2006).
However, the stimuli in our study did not have a priori emotionalvalence to them. None of the camouflage images in our experi-
ments were in and of themselves emotional, and there was no
pairing of those images with external rewarding or aversive
events. Indeed, different subjects tended to remember different
subsets of the camouflage solutions they were exposed to in
a manner that was idiosyncratic and unpredictable. At the
same time, the sudden realization of an insightful solution can
certainly be associated with the distinct saliency of the ‘‘Aha!’’
moment. Our results therefore suggest that the amygdala plays
a key role also in encoding events whose importance is not given
a priori and externally, but instead is determined internally, by the
organism itself. And, while better understanding of this hypothe-
sized internal process will require further research, several
observations can be made in the specific case of our study.
In the induced-insight paradigm, exposure to the solution (the
original image) could lead to an abrupt andmarked change in the
appearance of an unchanged sensory stimulus: from a (hitherto
meaningless) camouflage image to a vivid depiction of the
underlying real-world scene. At the same time, we know from
our pilot experiments that observers differ not only in terms of
which solution images they will retain inmemory days andweeks
later, but also in terms of their immediate responses to the
presentation of the camouflage-solution pairs. After exposure
to the solution, the very same camouflage image could appear
to one observer as a perceptually compelling representation of
that solution, yet be reported as being not very compelling by
another observer—and an opposite trend could be obtained
for another image. The ability to report the ‘‘goodness’’ of the
solution relies on an internal measure that may be computed
automatically and involuntarily, i.e., not only when an experi-
menter elicits the observer’s judgment. This evaluative
process—possibly mediated by the very same mechanisms
that give rise to the subjective ‘‘Aha!’’ experience for perceptually
compelling images—may therefore be what provides the internal
signal about the importance of the event, and ultimately deter-
mines how well it will be remembered. This suggests that the
solutions retained in memory will be those that created a more
compelling perceptual experience (a subset that differs for
different subjects). The fMRI data we obtained from other
regions, mainly the lateral occipital and the medial prefrontal
cortices (mPFCs), provide converging support for this account.
The posterior portions of the LOC were shown to be critical
for processing perceptual closure and surface completion,
segmentation, and grouping in studies that investigated visual
cortical activity before and after exposure to the solution of cam-
ouflage images (Dolan et al., 1997), aswell as in studies that used
other types of fragmented images of objects (e.g., Doniger et al.,
2000; Grill-Spector et al., 2000;Mendola et al., 1999; Stanley and
Rubin, 2003). In contrast, more anterior portions of the ventral
visual pathway, and in particular the pFs, seem to be involved
more in the processing of visual information about known
objects. Our finding that remembered camouflage solutions
are associated with increased activity in the LO, but not in the
pFs, therefore suggests that the most significant changes in
visual neural activity taking place during the induced insight
were the reorganization of figure/ground domains and surface
segmentation in the camouflage image (associated with LO),
not the acquisition of information about the embedded objectsNeuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1009
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above, that the remembered images were those that gave rise
to a more vivid perception of the underlying scene (after expo-
sure to the solution), and also offer a concrete way for the system
to evaluate the ‘‘goodness’’ of a solution, by measuring the
extent of neural reorganization in lateral occipital cortex.
The proposal that evaluative neural processes taking place
during induced insight affect subsequent memory is supported
also by the pattern of activity we observed in the mPFC and
the ACC. These regions have been implicated in a multitude of
evaluative processes, both intentional/reflective and automatic
(e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006). In a meta-analysis of neuroimag-
ing studies of human emotion, Phan et al. (2004) found that the
mPFC was involved in nearly 50% of the studies and proposed
that, taken together, the results suggest mPFC may be an inte-
grator of affective and cognitive processing. Importantly,
mPFC-amygdala interactions have also been well established
in both animal and human studies (Delgado et al., 2008; Phelps
et al., 2004; Quirk et al., 2003). The ACC has a well-established
role in conflict monitoring and cognitive control (Botvinick
et al., 2004), and it has also been proposed to take an important
part in reinforcement-guided learning and representation of
reward history (Rushworth et al., 2007). The ACC has also
been repeatedly implicated in previous studies of insight
(Subramaniam et al., 2009; Kounios et al., 2006). In the context
of our task, two main types of possibilities come to mind con-
cerning the role of the amygdala. One is that the amygdala inter-
acts with the integrative high-level processes in the frontal
regions to evaluate the internal value expressed in the extent
of the neural reorganization in visual cortex, and based on this
may facilitate long-term changes in circuits, e.g., visual, that
subserve the subsequent storage of the camouflage solution.
Alternatively, activity in the amygdala and frontal regions may
represent an evaluative process that has no causal relationship
with subsequent memory. Given the known role of amygdala in
memory encoding and consolidation at large (Aggleton, 2000),
we deem the former explanation more likely.
It is noteworthy that we did not find differential subsequent-
memory-correlated activation of the hippocampal formation in
our paradigm. This may result from either intensive engagement
of the hippocampal formation in nonmnemonic tasks taxed in the
encoding session, or, more likely, from the possibility that
whereas our memory test taps into declarative information,
successful encoding in our protocol can be achieved in a nonde-
clarative manner.
Our findings extend the known roles of amygdala inmemory to
include the promotion of long-term memory resulting from
a sudden, internal reorganization of information. The amygdala
is recognized to play a crucial part in emotional learning
(McGaugh, 2004; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). Notably it is also
correlated with reporting insight experience in solving phrase
completion task (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), and was found to
be critical for surprise-induced enhancement of learning in the
rat (Holland and Gallagher, 2006). Our proposal, that it plays an
important role in signaling to different cortical regions that an
internal, significant neural reorganization has occurred, is
consistent with these findings. What we suggest here is that
amygdala influence over cortical plasticity may arise also as1010 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.a result of evaluation of internal changes. The measure and
benefit of the change may serve in this case as a reinforcer.
This kind of mechanismmay be a driving force in making cortical
representations more efficient and compact.
In conclusion, we have introduced a paradigm that combines
induced perceptual insight with fMRI analysis of subsequent
memory performance as amodel for studyingmemory formation
of single exposure events.We found that activity in the amygdala
during the moment of induced insight could be used to predict
performance in a memory task 1 week later, a task that required
associative access to the content of the induced-insight event
(the pairing between a visual puzzle and its solution). We offered
a framework to explain these results that also provides an inte-
grative explanation to our other findings: increased activity
during the induced-insight event in intermediate-level visual
cortex (LO) and in the mPFC. In this framework, the amygdala
plays a central role also in memory formation of ongoing events
in which the stimulus is not a priori emotional or externally re-
warded, but leads to significant internal neural events (e.g.,
insight) by providing content-specific cortical regions (e.g., LO)
with modulatory signals about the importance of these events.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Sixty-five participants took part in this study: 37 in Experiment 1 (ages 21–
29 years, mean 24 years, 26 females), 17 in Experiment 2 (aged 19–38,
mean 25 years, 6 females), and 11 in Experiment 3 (aged 22–29,mean 25 years,
6 females). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Partici-
pants in Experiments 2 and 3, which included an fMRI scan, were all right-
handed. Unless otherwise indicated, participants were paid for their time.
The Stimulus Set
The stimuli used in these experiments were 40 camouflage images that were
experimentally screened out of a large collection of degraded real-world
pictures that portrayed a clear, nameable object or scene. The chosen images
were those in which the embedded object was not likely to be spontaneously
identified, yet once the solution (the original, nondegraded image) was pre-
sented, the object embedded in the camouflage image was usually vividly
perceived (i.e., the object was perceived as whole and created an impression
of depth, and no spurious solutions—false alarms—were perceived in the
image). For the full description of the generation and prescreening of the
images, see the Generation and prescreening of camouflage images section
in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures. Of the 40 images in the final
set, 17 were images of animals, 8 of human figures, 3 of human faces, 3 of
insects, and 5 of inanimate objects, and 4 contained a more complex scene
that combined, for example, a human figure and an object. (For an example
of an image from the set and its solution, see Figures 1 and 2.)
Visual Stimulation and Response Monitoring
Behavioral sessions took place in a quiet dark room, where participants were
seated in front of a 19’’ monitor (100 Hz refresh rate). Images were presented
on a medium gray background in the center of the screen and subtended
a mean height of 17.5 and a mean width of 21.26 visual angle. Participants
responded using the keyboard number buttons.
In the sessions performed in the fMRI scanner, the visual displaywas fed into
an LCD projector. The projected image appeared on a plastic rear-projection
screen, and participants viewed the stimuli through a mirror mounted on the
head coil. In Experiment 2 the images subtended a mean height of 13.12
and a mean width of 16 visual angle; responses were collected on a five-
button RIS-418 RURB button box (Rowland Institute, Cambridge, MA). In
Experiment 3 the images subtended a mean height of 7.3 and a mean width
of 10.9 visual angle; responses were collected using a response box that is
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manufactured by Current Designs Inc. (Philadelphia, PA).
Experiments were programmed in Presentation 0.81 (Neurobehavioral
Systems Inc., www.neurobs.com). Participants were briefed about the task
with written instructions and examples that were presented as a slide show,
and performed several practice trials until they understood the task. The
stimuli used in the practice trials were not drawn from the set of 40 images
used in the experiment itself.
Experimental Protocol
Three experiments are reported, Experiment 1, 2, and 3. The overall protocol in
all the experiments was similar and consisted of two sessions each, Study and
Test. Experiment 1 was behavioral only, and was conducted to determine
memory performance over time and select the time interval between the Study
and Test sessions to use in Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 1, separate
groups of participants performed the test session 15 min, 24 hr, 1 week, and
3 weeks after the Study session (9 or 10 participants in each group). In Exper-
iments 2 and 3, the Study session was performed while participants were
undergoing brain imaging in the fMRI scanner. The Study protocol was there-
fore slightly modified from Experiment 1 to adapt it to the fMRI environment.
The protocol described below (Figure 3A) is that of Experiment 2. (For descrip-
tions of the slightly different Study session protocols in Experiments 1 and 3,
see Figures S1 and S3 and Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The
Test session in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was identical to that of Exper-
iment 1 (Figure 3B) and performed 1 week after Study.
In the Study session, 30 camouflage images were presented, chosen
randomly for each participant out of the set of 40 images (in Experiment 3,
40 images were presented). Each camouflage image was presented for
10 s (CAM1). Participants were instructed to press a button if they thought
that they recognized the underlying scene during the presentation of the cam-
ouflage in CAM1 (the image remained on the screen for 10 s regardless of
whether and when the participant pressed the button). Note that the indication
of recognition at this stage is not necessarily accurate (it may include false
alarms or exclude correct recognitions in which the participant is not sure).
CAM1 was followed by 4 s in which the solution (the original gray-level image)
and the camouflage alternated four times, each presented for half a second
(SOL). Next, participants were presented again with the camouflage for
2 s (CAM2). Finally, to assess spontaneous recognition, a question appeared:
‘‘Did you identify the object in the camouflage image before the solution?’’
(QUERY). Participants were instructed to answer ‘‘Yes’’ even if they only
partially recognized the scene, as long as they discerned the main object.
They were also instructed to answer ‘‘Yes’’ if they recognized the object during
CAM1 even if they did not press the button at that stage (e.g., because they
were not sure their perception was correct) and, conversely, to answer ‘‘No’’
even if they indicated recognition during CAM1 in cases when during SOL
they saw that the camouflaged object was different from what they thought
they recognized during CAM1.
To allow the separation of the signal evoked by each event, a blank screen
(medium gray) was presented as an interstimulus interval (ISI) for a period of 2,
3, or 4 s (picked randomly) between the CAM1, SOL, and CAM2 stages. A
randomly picked intertrial interval (ITI) of 3, 4, or 5 s was also used.
For determination of memory performance in the Test session (Figure 3B), all
40 camouflage images from the stimulus set were presented to each partici-
pant. Thirty images (and their solutions) were therefore previously seen (in
the Study session), and the remaining ten images were novel (different ones
for different participants). Each camouflage image was presented for 10 s,
and the participants were instructed to press a button if they thought they iden-
tified the object in the image. Once they pressed the button, or after 10 s if they
did not press it, the four-option multiple choice question appeared, and the
participants were requested to identify the object in the image by pressing
one of four numbers on a keypad. The question remained on the screen until
a response was given, but not for longer than 10 s, and the next camouflage
image was then presented. If a choice was made within the 10 s limit, partic-
ipants were next asked to indicate their level of confidence: ‘‘guess,’’ ‘‘fairly
confident,’’ or ‘‘completely confident.’’ Regardless of the confidence level
indicated, if their answer to the multiple choice question was correct, the cam-
ouflage image was re-presented, with a Grid-map of numerals (1–9) superim-posed on it (Grid task). Participants were asked to specify the Grid-map
numeral overlaid on a specific feature of the object (e.g., ‘‘the eye of the
clown,’’ Figure 3B). The object features queried at the Grid questions were
ones that are not likely to be distinctive by themselves, but rather those whose
identification was facilitated by a holistic perception of the embedded object.
The image with the Grid-map was presented until a response was provided,
but not for more than 10 s. The chance level, combining the multiple choice
question and the Grid task question, is only 2.75% (25% at the multiple choice
question followed by 11% at the grid-map question). Therefore, in all subse-
quent analyses correct responses on both tests were used as indication that
the observer perceived the underlying scene correctly.
This classification was supported by two analyses. First, we compared the
number of these images with the expected number of chance correct answers
in the multiple choice task. The expected number of chance correct answers
(computed individually for each participant) is the number of images that
were indicated as not identified in the Study whose perceptual identification
was not verified in the Grid task, divided by four. The comparison of those
two sets of numbers revealed that they did not differ significantly (p = 0.15).
Second, inspection of the participants’ confidence report revealed that they
are much less confident in their answers for these images than for images
that were answered correctly in the Grid task. For correct multiple choice
answers, participants indicated that they are highly confident in 62% of the
Grid correct images (79 out of 128) but only in 37% of the Grid wrong images
(14 out of 38). This is even more marked for the Grid task confidence, where
they are highly confident in 77% of the Grid correct images but only in 19%
of the Grid wrong images. Our conclusion was that images for which partici-
pants did not provide a correct answer to the Grid task should be considered
as not having been retained in memory, or retained only semantically.
Statistical analysis of the behavioral data described in the Results section
was done using Statistica (StatSoft, Inc., 2004; version 6; www.statsoft.com).
Functional Neuroimaging
fMRI scanning during the Study session of Experiment 2 was conducted on a 3
Tesla head-only Siemens Allegra scanner at the Center for Brain Imaging (CBI)
in NewYork University. Seventeen healthy participants took part in the imaging
experiment. Thirteen of them were paid for their participation. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants, and all procedures were approved
by the NewYorkUniversity Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects.
Three participants were omitted from the analysis, one because of excessive
movements in the magnet and two because they did not complete the Test
session.
Structural scans (T1-weighted) were obtained with a head coil (transmitter/
receiver; NovaMedical, Wakefield, MA, model NM011). Functional scans used
the same head coil for excitation (transmit) and a flexible four element array of
surface coils placed evenly around the head for detection (receive; Nova
Medical, Wakefield, MA, model NMSC011). Two types of high-resolution
T1-weighted scans were obtained for each participant: (1) a set taken with
an MPRAGE sequence resulting in 1 3 1 3 1 mm voxels (256*256); and (2)
a set acquired with a T1-weighted spin echo sequence resulting in
3 3 1.5 31.5 mm voxels (128*128), taken with the same slice prescription as
that used for the functional scans (see below); the scan was used to obtain
a precise alignment between the functional data and the high-resolution
MPRAGE images. Functional (T2*-weighted) EPI images (TR = 2 s, TE =
30 ms, flip angle = 90) were acquired with an in-plane resolution of 64 3 64
resulting in 3 3 3 3 3 mm voxels.
Scanning during the Study Session
In Experiment 2, participants were continually scanned during presentation of
the 30 camouflage images of the Study session. Each trial lasted 20–34 s,
separated by an ITI of 3–5 s. The scans lasted a total of 775–809 s.
Lateral-Occipital ROI Localizer Runs
After completion of the Study session in Experiment 2, each participant per-
formed another functional run whose aim was to localize regions in the LOC;
Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Kanwisher et al., 1996; Malach et al., 1995). This
run consisted of 16 s blocks of pictures of everyday objects alternating with
blocks of scrambled versions of the same objects. The two types of blocks
repeated 12 times for a total of 384 s (192 fMRI acquisitions). The images
used are described in Stanley and Rubin (2003). They were shown in isolationNeuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 1011
Neuron
Brain Correlates of Memory of Induced Insighton a homogeneous background, and had a mean height of 7.6 and a mean
width of 8.9. Successive images were jittered ±0.6. Participants were
required to maintain fixation, observe the images, and press a button when-
ever the same image repeated twice consecutively.
MRI scanning during the Study session of Experiment 3 was conducted on
a 3T Trio Magnetom Siemens scanner at the Weizmann Institute of Science.
Eleven healthy participants took part in the imaging experiment. They were
all paid for their participation. Informed consent was obtained from all partic-
ipants, and the experimental protocol was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Sourasky Medical Center, Tel-Aviv. Two participants
were discarded from the analysis since they had almost no REM trials (one
participant had one REM trial and the other had two trials), and hence their
data could not be used for subsequent memory prediction.
All images were acquired using a 12 channel head matrix coil. Three-dimen-
sional T1-weighted anatomical scanswere acquired with high-resolution 1mm
slice thickness (3D MPRAGE sequence, TR 2300 ms, TE 2.98 ms, 1 mm3
voxels). Functional high-resolution scans were acquired, resulting in 2 3 2 3
2 mm voxels (22 slices without gap, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 36 ms, flip angle =
75). The slices were obtained at 30 toward the coronal plane from AC/PC,
with the amygdala at the center of the FOV, covering also most of the hippo-
campus, most of the temporal lobes, and the inferior half of the frontal lobes
(see Figure S3).
To obtain a precise alignment between the functional data and theMPRAGE
images, a T1-weighted spin echo sequence resulting in 2 3 1 3 1 mm voxels
was taken with the same slice prescription as that used for the functional
scans.
Scanning during the Study Session
In Experiment 3, participants were continually scanned during presentation of
the 40 camouflage images of the Study session. Each trial lasted 22–38 s,
separated by an ITI of 4–8 s. The scans lasted a total of 1358–1416 s.
fMRI Data Analysis
Unless otherwise indicated, fMRI data were processed using the BrainVoyager
QX 1.3 software package (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands). Data
were first corrected for head motion (scans with head movement larger than
2 mm were rejected) and for slice-timing acquisition. The runs were high-
pass filtered according to the period of stimulation (at 0.016 Hz for the
camouflage runs and at 0.005 for the localizer runs). The complete data set
was converted into Talairach space. For the multisubject voxel-by-voxel
GLM analyses (see below), data from the camouflage runs were spatially
smoothed with a 6 mm (full-width at half-height) Gaussian kernel. In all other
analyses, which were subject-specific, data were not spatially smoothed.
GLM: Experiment 2
Data from the camouflage Study runs were modeled by assigning a predictor
to each trial based on the behavioral performance: SPONT (‘‘spontaneous’’),
for those trials when the camouflage was reported (at the QUERY stage) as
identified spontaneously during Study (i.e., trials in which the SOL served
only as a confirmation of correct spontaneous perception and not as an event
of perceptual insight); REM (‘‘remembered’’), trials in which the camouflage
image was not spontaneously identified during CAM1 and the solution was
subsequently remembered, yielding correct performance on both the multiple
choice and the Grid tasks at Test 1 week later (i.e., trials in which the SOL
served as a learning event); and NotREM (‘‘not remembered’’), trials in which
the camouflage was not identified during Study and its solution was not
remembered during Test. Each of the three protocol stages (CAM1, SOL,
and CAM2) was assigned a separate predictor. Combined with the labels of
performance, this resulted in nine predictors (CAM1-REM, CAM1-NotREM,
CAM1-SPONT, et cetera). An additional predictor, blank, was used for all
the time frames in which the participants viewed a gray screen. These include
10 s prior to the start of the camouflage run, and the ISIs and ITIs during the run.
For each predictor, a boxcar function valued 1 (and 0 for the blank predictor)
was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (Boynton
et al., 1996).
For each comparison of interest, contrasts were created between the appro-
priate predictors (the main contrast compared activation during REM and
NotREM trials; see also the following ROIs subsections and Results), and
p values were calculated (t test) for each voxel. For the SOL versus baseline1012 Neuron 69, 1002–1014, March 10, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and the object localizer objects versus scrambled-objects contrasts, the
p values were adjusted for multiple comparisons using False Discovery Rate
controlling procedures (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995; Genovese et al.,
2002; Stanley and Rubin, 2003) before thresholding. Finally, voxels that did
not belong to contiguous clusters of at least five significant functional voxels
were eliminated.
ROIs: Experiment 2
ROIs were defined in three different ways. First, and based on prior results indi-
cating the occipito-temporal stream as crucial to shape perception and object
recognition (Grill-Spector andMalach, 2004), visual cortical ROIs were created
from the data obtained in the localizer scan. Data from those runs were
modeled using a boxcar predictor for each experimental condition except fixa-
tion (objects and scrambled objects). A hemodynamic lag of 4 or 6 s was fitted
to the model of each subject bymaximizing the extent of the overall visual acti-
vations. Statistical maps were created, separately for each observer, by con-
trasting the objects and scrambled objects predictors, and thresholded at
q < 0.005. ROIs were delineated from the resulting map in three separate
portions of occipito-temporal cortex (as identified by anatomical markers;
Duvernoy, 1999): the LO, the posterior to midparts of the fusiform gyrus
(pFs; Grill-Spector et al., 2000) and the CoS. In addition, voxels that were
significantly more active during the scrambled objects condition were
delineated in and around the calcarine fissure as an early visual ROI (EarlyVis;
Figure S2). We were able to delineate the LO and EarlyVis ROIs in all 14 partic-
ipants, the pFs ROI in 12 participants, the left CoS in 10 participants, and the
right CoS in 8 participants.
Second, another set of ROIs was generated from the data obtained in the
camouflage run itself by contrasting activity during the SOL stage of all three
event types (SPONT, REM, and NotREM) with activity during the time period
of baseline (blank) trials and thresholding at q < 0.05. Note that by collapsing
across all event types, the resulting statistical map, and the ROIs extracted
from it, was unbiased with respect to subsequent memory performance
(Kensinger and Corkin, 2004). This contrast resulted in extensive activations
in visual as well as frontal areas, and also in prominent activation clusters in
bilateral amygdala (for the full list of activations, see Table S1). To examine
more closely the activity in those brain regions that were particularly engaged
during SOL (and for which we did not have independent localizer data), we
delineated from the results of this contrast ROIs in the frontal cortex (in the
lateral orbital gyrus and in the inferior frontal sulcus) and in the amygdala (as
identified by anatomical markers; Duvernoy, 1999). Following Johnstone
et al. (2005), the amygdala ROI was defined separately for each subject. For
each participant we took the clusters of three contiguous functional voxels
activated in conjunction with group level activation. We were able to delineate
activation in the left amygdala for 11 participants, but in the right amygdala,
only for 6. (Even when the threshold for the right amygdala was relaxed to
q < 0.15, we were able to delineate the right amygdala ROI for only eight
subjects, and the additional data did not change the results.)
Finally, we delineated the hippocampus based on the high-resolution
T1-weighted MRI images and on established anatomical landmarks
(Pruessner et al., 2000). Three separate hippocampal ROIs were defined for
each observer separately: head, body, and tail.
For each of the ROIs we extracted the time course obtained during the cam-
ouflage Study session, separately in each participant. The time courses were
linearly interpolated from the TR resolution (2 s) to 1 s resolution, to fit the
protocol time course, and transformed into percent signal change, based on
the two TRs preceding each event. (This and all other time course calculations
were done using Matlab, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, version 6.1, 2001.)
ROI time course data were first analyzed by computing event-triggered
averages for each event type (SPONT, REM, and NotREM) separately for
each stage in the trial (CAM1, SOL, CAM2; Figure 3A). These curves were
calculated for each ROI (with means and standard errors computed across
participants), and allowed us to visually inspect the shapes of the hemody-
namic response functions.
To perform statistical testing on the ROI time course data, the BOLD activity
values from 4 to 10 s after the onset of each stage of the protocol were ex-
tracted for each trial (or 4 to 12 s for CAM1 events, which were longer). These
corresponded to the peak time points of the hemodynamic response functions
obtained for each stage from the event-triggered averages. Each series of time
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(SPONT, REM, or NotREM) and with the participant’s index. In this manner
we obtained for each stage of the trial (CAM1, SOL, and CAM2) a matrix of
420 rows (30 trials per participant 3 14 participants) and 9 columns (seven
time points, plus one column for participant index and one for behavioral
performance status, i.e., event type; CAM1 events had 11 columns). Such
a matrix was obtained for each ROI. (For those ROIs that were identified in
less than the full set of 14 participants, the number of rows was accordingly
smaller). The matrices were imported into Statistica (Statsoft Inc.) and the
values at each time point were subjected to a mixed-model ANOVA with event
type (REM, NotREM, or SPONT) as one factor, and participant index as
a random factor, to determine whether there were significant differences
between the BOLD activity within the same region in different event types.
A comparison between two event types was considered significant if the
resulting p value for three consecutive time points was significant, with a crite-
rion a = 0.05 and aBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (for SOL and
CAM2, three consecutive time points out of seven time points provide five
comparisons, therefore a* = 0.01; for CAM1, three consecutive time points
out of nine time points provide seven comparisons, therefore a* = 0.007).
Among the trials where participants did not spontaneously recognize the
image during Study, the total number of trials that were performed correctly
during Test (REM events) was 128 (across all participants). The total number
of trials where an error was performed during Test (in the multiple choice,
Grid task, or both; NotREM events) was 178. The number of trials where the
underlying object was recognized spontaneously during CAM1 (SPONT
events) was 114.
GLM: Experiment 3
Data from the camouflage Study runs of Experiment 3 were modeled in the
same manner as in Experiment 2, except that to avoid circularity of the predic-
tion, the subsequent memory information was not used in the GLM. The
predictors were hence: SPONT, for those trials when the camouflage was
reported (at the QUERY stage) as identified spontaneously during Study (i.e.,
trials in which SOL served only as a confirmation of correct spontaneous
perception and not as an event of perceptual insight), and NotIdentified, for
those trials when the camouflage was reported as not identified spontaneously
during the Study session.
ROIs: Experiment 3
The only ROIs delineated from the data of Experiment 3 were those of the
amygdala, for the purpose of subsequent memory trial-by-trial prediction.
The amygdala ROIs were generated similarly to those for Experiment 2, this
time by contrasting activity during the SOL stage of both event types (SPONT
and NotIdentified) with activity during the time period of baseline (blank) trials.
In this data set we were able to delineate activation in the left amygdala for
eight of the nine participants, and again in the right amygdala, only for six.
Trial-by-Trial Subsequent Memory Prediction in Experiment 3
For each of the amygdala ROIs, we extracted the time course obtained during
thecamouflageStudy session, separately in eachparticipant. The timecourses
were linearly interpolated from the TR resolution (2 s) to 1 s resolution, to fit the
protocol time course, and transformed into percent signal change, based on
the twoTRs preceding each event. TheBOLDactivity values from6 to 14 s after
the onset of the SOL stage of the protocol were extracted for each trial, and the
area under the curve was computed. Each series of time points was labeled
with the behavioral performance associated with it (SPONT or NotIdentified)
and with the participant’s index. Next, we sorted the NotIdentified trials by
the area under the curve value. At Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, REM trials
consisted on average of 40% of the total number of the NotIdentified images.
Hencewedivided the sorted trials list into the top 40%,whichwere labeledPre-
dicted-REM, and the bottom 60%, which were labeled Predicted-notREM. For
each subjectwe then computed the hit and false alarm rate of the prediction, as
compared with the actual subsequent memory performance. (This was done
using Matlab, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, version 6.1, 2001.)
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